



The Participation of Colombia in United Nations'
multidimensional peace operations : a complex
national dilemma

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The participation of Colombia in United Nations' multidimensional peace operations: a complex national dilemma

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Abstract

This article challenges conventional explanations why Colombia (a country emerging from an armed internal conflict but still with multiple defense/security challenges) should participate in the United Nations' multidimensional peace operations. While official rationale maintains that contribution to peacekeeping is a common stage for countries within a post-peace agreement scenario to gain worldwide recognition, international experience suggests that the occurrence of several other circumstances is necessary before making such a commitment. The results of a statistical analysis show how disarmament, demobilization, reintegration, the level of implementation of the agreement, undertaking a citizenship reform, addressing minority rights, and solving issues with criminal groups are fundamental for deciding on participation in peace operations. Additionally, while international missions may be considered a way of enhancing civil-military relations, cautious assessments should be made to determine the military capabilities needed to guarantee national interests and to strengthen foreign policy without fostering a regional security dilemma.

Keywords: civil-military cooperation, lessons learned, National Army of Colombia, multidimensional peace operations, security dilemma, United Nations

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Introduction

Over the past three decades, the intricacy of the United Nations' multidimensional peace operations (hereafter UNMDPO), defined as "a mix of military, police, and civilian components working together to lay the foundations of a sustainable peace" (UN DPKO, 2008, p. 97), has stimulated growing cooperative work between armed forces and civilian institutions around the world. Since 1948, 71 UNMDPO have been developed to maintain international peace and security under the mandate of the UN Charter and to increase the scope, coverage, and protection of humanitarian assistance (UN DPKO, 2017b, p. 13).

Although it is frequently believed that developed countries are the main contributors to UNMDPO, it is becoming increasingly difficult to ignore that few developing countries have contributed with personnel (military experts, troops, police, and staff officers) in far superior quantities than industrialized states to support such operations. For example, since 1948, Ethiopia has contributed 8,221 peacekeepers, Pakistan 7,123, Egypt 3,060, Burkina Faso 2,933, Senegal 2,820, Ghana 2,752, and Nigeria 1,667. In comparison, China contributed 2,515, Italy 1,083, Japan 1,012, France 804, Germany 804, the UK 700, and the USA 74 (UN DPKO, 2017a). Moreover, it is noteworthy that countries which have solved challenging armed conflicts by peace agreements and that are still striving with complex national scenarios have led participation in UNMDPO by employing their militaries to strengthen foreign policy and gain international recognition by optimizing aid distribution and improving the physical security of humanitarian agencies. For instance, India has provided 7,676 peacekeepers, Bangladesh 7,013, Rwanda 6,203, Nepal 5,202, Senegal 2,820, Indonesia 2,715, South Africa 1,428, Niger 1,151, Cambodia 823, Burundi 790, and Congo 768 (UN DPKO, 2017a).

This trend of participation in UNMDPO by countries which have ended their internal conflicts by peace agreements may be misunderstood at first sight as a strong tendency to be followed by other states with similar characteristics, especially in the absence of relevant

literature and comparative studies. This may be so in the case of Colombia as it has recently entered into a peace agreement with the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC)² which is still in its commencing implementation phase. Colombia also receives a great deal of persistent threats from, for example, the ELN³, EPL⁴, and FARC dissidents and several other organized armed groups⁵ (Alvarez, 2016; Avila, 2016); and has a high external debt of 41% of its GDP (Castaño, 2017). In sum, a great deal of challenges for the following decade; nevertheless, Colombia has widely stated its strong intention of participation in UNMDPO with up to three battalions of 5,000 peacekeepers (Republic of Colombia - Office of the Press Secretary, 2015).

This commitment of the Colombian government was settled with the UN through a framework agreement on January 2015 (Valero, 2015; El Tiempo, 2015), officially announced by the president Juan Manuel Santos Calderon during the 2015 United Nations' leaders' summit on peacekeeping (El Herald, 2015), and ratified by the Congress of the Republic of Colombia (2016). It has generated a national debate in Colombia on the appropriateness of its participation in UNMDPO given the foreseen multifaceted defense/security scenario, the provisions of the peace agreement that remain outstanding with the FARC, and the scarcity of funds for the years to come. However, minimal research has been undertaken on the topic.

This article will study, using a holistic methodology, three main explanations commonly given in the Colombian context for the country's motivation to participate in UNMDPO: the need to gain international recognition; the need to seek alternative sources of

² FARC stands for *Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia*, as per its initials in Spanish.

³ ELN stands for the National Revolutionary Army, as per its initials in Spanish.

⁴ EPL stands for the Popular Liberation Army, as per its initials in Spanish.

⁵ Defined by the Colombian Ministry of Defense (2016a) as groups which use violence against the armed forces or other state institutions, civilian populations, civilian property, or other armed groups, with the capacity to generate levels of armed violence that surpass the that of internal disturbances and tensions, with organization, responsible command, and control over a part of the territory.

funding for the armed forces; and the need to improve legitimacy and civil-military relations. This will be done by drawing on data on the Peace Accord Matrix (hereafter PAM) of the Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies at the University of Notre Dame⁶ and on data from the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (hereafter, UN DPKO). Similarly, it aims to provide fundamentals which may help Colombia to improve its defense/security decision-making process to better decide on the scope and strategies necessary to be an effective actor in UNMDPO.

The first section of this article will provide a brief summary on the changing character of the UNMDPO across the years. It will then debate conventional wisdom in Colombia on the necessity of participation in such operations. Finally, it will provide some insights which may help provide scope and strategies needed for Colombia to successfully contribute to UNMDPO.

The changing character of the UN multi-dimension peace operations

Since the end of the cold war, there has been an increasing number of intra-state conflicts plagued with human rights violations, ethnic/religious cleansing, and a contempt for human life, making effective UNMDPO more necessary than ever (Simma & Paulus, 1999; Thoms & Ron, 2007; Donnelly, 2013; Shelton, 2015; Sriram, Martin-Ortega, & Herman, 2017). Similarly, incidents of UNMDPO have increased as an attempt to combat violence while honoring its non-intervention in domestic affairs policy, as prescribed in chapter I of the UN charter (2011, p. 3).

Over the years, the complexity of conflicts and the actors therein have proven that first-generation peace operations (limited to the employment of troops to monitor ceasefire or disarmament [Bellamy, 2004]) and second-generation peace operations (where troops acted as

⁶ Available at <https://peaceaccords.nd.edu/>

catalyzers among adversaries to prevent conflict [Mackinlay & Chopra, 1992]), may be ineffective in scenarios in which comprehensive support for building state capacity and legitimacy is needed. Usually, in a post-peace accord scenario wherein unsolved grievances fuel the possibility of a relapse into violence and configure an unstable peace environment, it is the military who commences humanitarian tasks and building state-capacity while the situation is controlled and this can then be transferred to civil organizations. However, after some unfortunate experiences, such as the conflicts in the Balkans, Rwanda, and Somalia, where even the credibility of and the need for the UN were questioned, it was recognized that there was a need for a new strategy whereby the UN and its members would have the obligation to safeguard human life in the case that state efforts are insufficient in preventing or stopping war crimes, genocide, or crimes against humanity (Simons, 2003).

The result of the goal of the responsibility to protect (R2P) policy is that, although it is controversial, it implies a significant international and comprehensive commitment whereby humanitarian action plays a central role. This new approach requires a carefully designed strategy and a precise combination of peacekeeping and peace enforcement tasks. In other words, this involves multiparty humanitarian efforts led by the UN with civilian peacekeepers and armed forces' assistance (usually known as multidimensional peace operations [MDPO]) or, more specifically, third- (principally involving armed forces) or fourth-generation (principally involving civilian police forces) peacekeeping operations (Malan, 1998, p. 13; Kenkel, 2013, p. 130). Consequently, the UN (2008, p. 22) have described MDPO as operations which are "typically deployed in the dangerous aftermath of a violent internal conflict and may employ a mix of military, police, and civilian capabilities to support the implementation of a comprehensive peace agreement."

Although such civil-military cooperation may improve the effectiveness of UNMDPO by the utilization of the capabilities of the military and its experience, it has also generated

some dilemmas for contributing nations which challenge the rationale for the need for participation in such operations. For instance, Gourlay (2000), Pugh (2001), Guttieri (2004), Coning (2005), Bruneau and Matei (2008), Hultman (2010), Diehl and Balas (2014), Lucius and Rietjens (2016), and Rudolf (2017) considered the contradiction in the principles of UNMDPO: the humanity, neutrality, impartiality, and independence (OCHA, 2012) of humanitarian actions led, accompanied, or supported by armed forces. Similarly, George (1993), Ankersen (2007), Bove and Elia (2010), Dorussen (2016), Williams (2016), Yamashita (2016), Abba, Osman, and Muda (2017), and Kathman and Melin (2017) referred to the shortcomings of involving armed forces in foreign policy and resolving alien tensions while they are still needed in their countries to address the threats and challenges of a globalized world.

This perception is especially critical for countries seeking participation in the international arena but which are still striving to implement peace agreements, consolidate a stable post-accord scenario, and deal with financial burdens. This is because their participation raises questions on the advantages of participation in UNMDPO and the potential consequences thereof. UNMDPO are a permanent challenge to their actors because of the complex interdependence between decisions and their subsequent effects. An erroneous understanding of new participants on the purpose of the troops, military experts, or staff personnel may lead to adverse consequences in terms of damage to the credibility of humanitarian aid and its accompanying security scenario (Greener, 2011; Curran, 2017; Ruffa, 2017).

Debating conventional wisdom on UNMDPO in Colombia

Participating in international missions is not a new task for the Colombian armed forces,⁷ as they participated in the Korean war for almost two years (1951-1953) with an infantry battalion of 4,750 soldiers and three frigates (Atehortua, 2008; Wallace, 2013; Melendez, 2015). Additionally, since 1982, the National Army of Colombia has maintained an infantry battalion in the Sinai Peninsula as part of the independent multinational force and observers (MFO) overseeing the terms of the peace agreement between Israel and Egypt (National Army of Colombia, 2017; MFO, 2017). Likewise, the National Police (2011) has contributed more than 100 officers to the UN Stabilization Mission in Haiti; and the Colombian Navy (2015) participated in international maritime security operations in the Indian Ocean, the Horn of Africa, and the Gulf of Oman. Finally, according to the Colombian Ministry of Defense, since 2010, the armed forces have trained more than 29,000 servicemen and women under defense/security regional agreements (Colombian Ministry of Defense, 2016b; Tickner, 2016, p. 20). However, limited participation has had Colombian armed forces in UNMDPO and especially under duress in conditions such as those of Mali (MINUSMA), Darfur (UNAMID), or Lebanon (UNIFIL) with a duration of several years or with multiple casualties caused by malicious acts or illness (Appendix 1 and 2).

Since the signing of the peace agreement with the FARC in November 2016, conventional wisdom in Colombia on defense/security matters is of the opinion that countries emerging from armed conflicts by peace agreements no longer require the same military capabilities and, hence, their armed forces should be transformed to address new threats and challenges and to redirect some of their experience to support international missions as a way of raising funds and encouraging self-sufficiency (Cardenas, 2003; Martinez, 2014; Cardenas

⁷ Understood as the armed forces (Army, Navy, and Air Force) and the National Police.

& Petro, 2014; Alarcon, 2015; Ruiz, Galeano, & Gil, 2016; Acosta, 2016; Herran, 2016; Zacarias, 2016; Odebrecht, 2017; Abella & Lesmes, 2017).

While some professionals and sectors of academia have praised this commitment as possibly strengthening foreign policy, advertising Colombian military capabilities and experience abroad, and redirecting funding to more sensitive areas (Vallejo, 2015; Villegas, 2016), some experts and think tanks disagree and maintain that there are many tasks for the armed forces to fulfill in Colombia and that reducing their budget and contributing personnel and equipment to UNMDPO will weaken the necessary efforts to secure areas vacated by the FARC and to address other threats (Gutierrez & Osorio, 2016; Monsalve, 2017b).

Nevertheless, despite the importance of this discussion for Colombia and the undeniable influence thereof on foreign affairs, the literature on this complex national dilemma is still scarce and insufficient. Limited academic analyses have been carried out with the aim of assessing the reasons for and perspectives on the initiative of participation in UNMDPO. For instance, in this debate in Colombia, the impact of the level of implementation of the peace agreement on the participation of the armed forces in UNMDPO or the existence of other persistent armed groups have been ignored. Similarly, the accomplishment of peace agreement provisions such as “disarmament,” “demobilization,” “reintegration,” and “human rights” has been disregarded as well.

Hence, to determine the trends in the international experience of countries which have solved their internal armed conflicts by peace agreements by contributing personnel (military experts, troops, police, and staff officers) to UNMDPO, an analysis of data from the PAM of the Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies at the University of Notre Dame and data from the UN DPKO was undertaken. On the one hand, the PAM provides a characterization of

peace agreements (Table 1) in 31 between 1989 and 2012⁸ in the light of 51 types of provisions. Likewise, it provides data regarding the implementation level of the peace agreements 10 years after the signature of the final document (Table 2). On the other hand, the UN DPKO provides official data on the contribution of personnel by countries to UNMDPO.

A regression analysis was undertaken based on these two datasets. The independent variable “contribution of personnel to UNMDPO” (measured in terms of the number of peacekeepers) was analyzed against a set of 52 predictors: one dependent variable “level of implementation” (measured between 0-100%) and 51 dummy variables (the provisions of the PAM described in Table 3 such as “amnesty”, “arms embargo”, “boundary demarcation”, and “cease fire” measured “yes” or “not”). The predictors were divided into four groups to facilitate the analysis. Appendices 3 to 6 describe the results of the regression analysis.

⁸ A full explanation of Kroc’s Peace Accords Matrix provisions, methodology, and definitions has been undertaken by Madhav, Quinn, and Regan (2015); additional information can be found on the webpage of the Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies, University of Notre Dame (2015a).

Table 1. Peace Accord Matrix (PAM) provisions and countries (1989 – 2012)

<i>Peace Accord Matrix (PAM) provisions</i>							
<i>Code</i>	<i>Provision title</i>	<i>Code</i>	<i>Provision title</i>	<i>Code</i>	<i>Provision title</i>	<i>Code</i>	<i>Provision title</i>
P1	Amnesty	P14	Disarmament	P27	Judiciary reform	P40	Regional peacekeeping force
P2	Arms embargo	P15	Dispute resolution committee	P28	Legislative branch reform	P41	Reintegration
P3	Boundary demarcation	P16	Donor support	P29	Media reform	P42	Reparations
P4	Cease fire	P17	Economic and social development	P30	Military reform	P43	Review of agreement
P5	Children's rights	P18	Education reform	P31	Minority rights	P44	Right of self-determination
P6	Citizenship reform	P19	Electoral / political party reform	P32	Natural resource management	P45	Territorial power sharing
P7	Civil administration reform	P20	Executive branch reform	P33	Official Language and Symbol	P46	Truth or reconciliation mechanism
P8	Commission to address damage	P21	Human rights	P34	Paramilitary groups	P47	Un peacekeeping force
P9	Constitutional reform	P22	Independence referendum	P35	Police reform	P48	UN transitional authority
P10	Cultural protections	P23	Indigenous minority rights	P36	Power sharing transitional govt.	P49	Verification mechanism
P11	Decentralization / federalism	P24	Inter-ethnic / state relations	P37	Prisoner release	P50	Withdrawal of troops
P12	Demobilization	P25	Internally displaced persons	P38	Ratification mechanism	P51	Women's rights
P13	Detailed implementation timeline	P26	International arbitration	P39	Refugees		
<i>Peace Accord Matrix (PAM) accords (31 countries)</i>							
<i>Code</i>	<i>Peace accord title</i>	<i>Code</i>	<i>Peace accord title</i>	<i>Code</i>	<i>Peace accord title</i>	<i>Code</i>	<i>Peace accord title</i>
C1	Angola	C10	El Salvador	C19	Mali	C28	Sierra Leone
C2	Bangladesh	C11	Guatemala	C20	Mozambique	C29	South Africa
C3	Bosnia and Herzegov.	C12	Guinea-Bissau	C21	Nepal	C30	Sudan
C4	Burundi	C13	India	C22	Niger	C31	Tajikistan
C5	Cambodia	C14	Indonesia	C23	Northern Ireland (UK)		
C6	Congo	C15	Ivory Coast	C24	Papua New Guinea		
C7	Croatia	C16	Lebanon	C25	Philippines		
C8	Djibouti	C17	Liberia	C26	Rwanda		
C9	East Timor	C18	Macedonia	C27	Senegal		

Source: Prepared by the author on the basis of data from the Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies (2015a), Madhav, Quinn, and Regan (2015), and the Colombian government and FARC (2016).

Table 2. Countries with peace agreements (1989 – 2012) and their contribution to UNMDPO

<i>Code</i>	<i>Country</i>	<i>Year</i>	<i>Peace agreement</i>	<i>Implementation (1-100%) 10 y</i>	<i>Police</i>	<i>Military experts</i>	<i>Troops</i>	<i>Staff Officers</i>	<i>Total PKO Personnel</i>
C1	Angola	2002	Luena memorandum of understanding	88	0	0	0	0	0
C2	Bangladesh	1997	Chittagong hill tracts peace accord	49	1122	53	5730	108	7013
C3	Bosnia and Herzegov.	1995	General framework agreement for peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina	93	37	5	0	2	44
C4	Burundi	2000	Arusha peace and reconciliation agreement for Burundi	78	10	13	747	20	790
C5	Cambodia	1991	Framework for a comprehensive political settlement of the Cambodia conflict	73	0	15	794	14	823
C6	Congo	1999	Agreement on ending hostilities in the Republic of Congo	73	140	4	618	6	768
C7	Croatia	1995	Erdut agreement	73	0	16	0	1	17
C8	Djibouti	1994	Accord de paix et de la reconciliation nationale	89	153	2	0	0	155
C9	East Timor	1999	Agreement between Indonesia and the Portuguese Republic on the question of East Timor	94	1	0	0	0	1
C10	El Salvador	1992	Chapultepec peace agreement	96	27	47	142	3	219
C11	Guatemala	1996	Accord for a firm and lasting peace	69	0	25	155	13	193
C12	Guinea-Bissau	1998	Abuja peace agreement	96	0	0	0	1	1
C13	India	1993	Bodo Accord	24	760	67	6755	94	7676
C14	Indonesia	2005	MoU between the government of Indonesia and the Free Aceh movement	87	182	38	2452	43	2715
C15	Ivory Coast	2007	Ouagadougou political agreement	83	43	1	150	6	200
C16	Lebanon	1989	Taif accord	59	0	0	0	0	0
C17	Liberia	2003	Accra peace agreement	88	0	0	69	4	73
C18	Macedonia	2001	Ohrid agreement	91	0	0	0	1	1
C19	Mali	1992	National pact	83	41	2	0	0	43
C20	Mozambique	1992	General peace agreement for Mozambique	92	0	0	0	0	0
C21	Nepal	2006	Comprehensive peace agreement	72	708	55	4336	103	5202
C22	Niger	1995	Agreement between the Republic Niger government and the ORA	65	141	17	975	18	1151
C23	Northern Ireland (UK)	1998	Northern Ireland good friday agreement	95	0	7	667	26	700
C24	Papua New Guinea	2001	Bougainville peace agreement	89	0	3	0	1	4
C25	Philippines	1996	Mindanao final agreement	59	13	7	135	2	157
C26	Rwanda	1993	Arusha accord	74	1049	32	5048	74	6203
C27	Senegal	2004	General peace agreement between the government of the Republic of Senegal and MFDC	33	1318	5	1459	38	2820
C28	Sierra Leone	1999	Lome peace agreement	83	74	9	0	12	95
C29	South Africa	1993	Interim constitution accord	92	56	12	1330	30	1428
C30	Sudan	2005	Sudan comprehensive peace agreement	73	0	0	0	0	0
C31	Tajikistan	1997	General agreement on the establishment of peace and national accord in Tajikistan	76	0	0	0	0	0


Source: prepared by the author based on data from the Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies (2015b) and UN DPKO (2017a)

The first group of predictors (Appendix 3): “level of implementation,” “amnesty,” “arms embargo,” “boundary demarcation,” “ceasefire,” “children's rights,” “citizenship reform,” “civil administration reform,” “commission to address damage/loss,” “constitutional reform,” “cultural protections,” “decentralization/federalism,” and “demobilization,” when taken as a set, account for 70% of the variance in the contribution of personnel to UNMDPO ($R^2 = 0.70$). The overall regression model was significant, $\alpha = 0.05$, $F(13,17) = 3.06$, $p = 0.016522 < 0.05$, meaning that there is only a 1.65% chance that the ANOVA output was obtained by chance.

One anticipated finding was that there is a significant possible correlation between the contribution to UNMDPO and the level of implementation of a peace agreement ($p = 0.016915 < 0.05$). In other words, the higher the level of implementation, the higher the possibility that a country would decide to contribute personnel to UNMDPO. Similarly, there is a significant possible correlation between the contribution to UNMDPO and the demobilization of an armed group as result of a peace agreement ($p = 0.044772 < 0.05$). Surprisingly, the regression analysis showed that there is a significant possible correlation between the contribution of personnel to UNMDPO and citizenship reform as an outcome of a peace agreement ($p = 0.044167 < 0.05$). In the case of Colombia, both the level of implementation of the peace agreement with the FARC and its demobilization are central when the country planned on contributing to UNMDPO. However, it is important to consider that still there are other armed groups which may create the same level of violence as the FARC and, hence, full military capabilities would be needed in the country. To date, independent researchers, government officials, and the FARC itself have reported that several FARC factions will abandon the peace agreement to create a dissident group or join other groups (Amarocho, 2016; El Espectador, 2016; FARC, 2016). Likewise, transnational groups such as Mexico's Gulf Cartel have started to open new branches in Colombia to seize the vast criminal possibilities in the country,

especially with regards to smuggling, illegal migration, illicit mining, and drug trafficking (Moreno, 2016; Bristow, 2017). As a result, traditional rural violence and crimes generated by the conflict with the FARC (such as homicides and massacres) have decreased, but urban crimes such as vehicle theft and common theft have increased. This is presumably due to the migration of the illegal organizations to the cities in which the most profitable crime opportunities exist (Figure 1).

Figure 1. Variation of homicides, vehicle theft and common theft in Colombia (2008-2016)



Source: prepared by the author based on information from the Colombian Ministry of Defense (2017)

The second group of predictors (Appendix 4), “detailed implementation timeline,” “disarmament,” “dispute resolution committee,” “donor support,” “economic and social development,” “education reform,” “electoral/political party reform,” “executive branch reform,” “human rights,” “independence referendum,” “indigenous minority rights,” “inter-ethnic/state relations,” and “internally displaced persons,” when taken as a set, account for the 64% of the variance in the contribution of personnel to UNMDPO ($R^2 = 0.64$). The overall regression model was non-significant, $\alpha = 0.05$, $F(13.17) = 2.29$, $p = 0.055057 > 0.05$, meaning that there is a 5.50% chance that the ANOVA output was obtained by chance. However, for the dummy variable “disarmament,” $p = 0.042427 < 0.05$, demonstrating that there is a significant possible correlation between the contribution of personnel to UNMDPO and the

disarmament of an armed group as a result of a peace agreement. This correlation was expected because the fulfilment of disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) of an armed group is perhaps the final goal of a peace agreement.

The third group of predictors (Appendix 5), “international arbitration,” “judiciary reform,” “legislative branch reform,” “media reform,” “military reform,” “minority rights,” “natural resource management,” “official language and symbol,” “paramilitary groups,” “police reform,” “power sharing transitional government,” “prisoner release,” and “ratification mechanism,” when taken as a set, account for 62% of the variance in the contribution of personnel to UNMDPO ($R^2 = 0.62$). The overall regression model was non-significant, $\alpha = 0.05$, $F(13,17) = 2.16$, $p = 0.068861 > 0.05$, meaning that there is a 6.88% chance that the ANOVA output was obtained by chance. However, for the dummy variables “minority rights” $p = 0.017009 < 0.05$ and “paramilitary groups” $p = 0.035393 < 0.05$, demonstrating that there is a significant possible correlation between the contribution of personnel to UNMDPO and resolving issues with minorities and with paramilitary groups. Colombia has an unfortunate history of unresolved grievances on minority rights which many scholars identify as one of the motivators for the internal armed conflict (Restrepo & Rojas, 2004; Trujillo, 2014; Tesillo, 2016; Tuiran, 2017; Carvajal, Lopera, Álvarez, Mantilla, & Contreras, 2017). Similarly, criminal organizations misnamed as paramilitary groups along with insurgent groups have been identified as instigators of a large part of the violence, dehumanization, and prolongation of the conflict (Giraldo, 2014; Gutierrez-Sanin, 2014; Tobar, 2015; Pacheco, 2016; Grajales, 2017).

The fourth group of predictors (Appendix 6), “refugees,” “regional peacekeeping force,” “reintegration,” “reparations,” “review of agreement,” “right of self-determination,” “territorial power sharing,” “truth or reconciliation mechanism,” “UN peacekeeping force,” “UN transitional authority,” “verification mechanism,” “withdrawal of troops,” and “women's rights,” when taken as a set, account for 42% of the variance in the contribution of personnel

to UNMDPO ($R^2 = 0.42$). The overall regression model was non-significant, $\alpha = 0.05$, $F(13.17) = 0.96$, $p = 0.517500 > 0.05$, meaning that there is a 51.55% chance that the ANOVA output was obtained by chance.

These results imply that conventional rationale in Colombia about the participation of countries arising from violent intra-state conflicts in UNMDPO is faulty as international experience shows that they consider several factors (such as the level of implementation of a peace agreement, the results of the DDR process, and resolving problems with citizenship, minority rights, and paramilitary groups) before making such a commitment. Therefore, Colombia should carefully assess the implications of participation in UNMDPO without having appropriately accomplished the provisions included in the peace agreement with the FARC and the new grievances, threats, and challenges that the DDR of this rebel group may bring.

The complexity of participating in UNMDPO

Other tendency in Colombia about UNMDPO is the general unfamiliarity on the essence of the missions that would be assigned to the armed forces and the possible risks associated with them. While UN military peacekeepers are essentially employed to “protect civilians and UN personnel; monitor a disputed border; monitor and observe peace processes in post-conflict areas; provide security across a conflict zone; assist in-country military personnel with training and support; and assist ex-combatants in implementing the peace agreements, they may have signed” (UN DPKO, 2017g, p. 1), UN peacekeepers are usually dealing with unstable situations in which relapse into violence or a misunderstanding of their mission may cause fatalities. For example, until June 2017, 2,597 UN military peacekeepers, 88 UN military observers, and 264 UN police officers have died on mission (UN DPKO, 2017c, p. 3). India reported 163 fatalities,

Nigeria 150, Pakistan 142, Ghana 137, and Bangladesh 129, being these countries some of the most affected with fatalities during UNMDPO (UN DPKO, 2017e).

Appendices 5 and 6 summarize the UNMDPO which have been developed so far, with an average per operation of 49 fatalities, 18 by accident, 16 by illness, 13 by malicious acts, and 3 by other non-disclosed reasons. While participation in UNMDPO may be a useful opportunity for Colombia to export its military capabilities and expand its international recognition, the possibility of casualties occurring during such operations may be counterproductive to the collective imagination and the official vision of having one of the best militaries of the world, enhanced by the experience of almost 60 years of armed conflict (Marino, 2015; Rincon, 2016; Semana, 2016; Monsalve, 2017a; Amaya, 2017; Rodriguez, 2017). Exploring the best possible scenarios in which the use of Colombian military, in the light of a comprehensive DOTMLPFM-I assessment,⁹ may be applicable and suitable should be a priority of the Colombian government when deciding to contribute troops to UNMDPO.

In the same way, UNMDPO have an average duration of eight years (Appendices 5 and 6). Such a duration may require at least three different contingents: one deployed in operations, one under training and certification to replace the contingent in operations, and a third being debriefed on its experiences and lessons learned during its deployment as well as providing advice on the improvement of policies and tactics in order to adequately fulfil the task and to meet the UN Peacekeeping Capability Readiness System (PCRS) and its four levels of readiness (UN DPKO, 2017g, p. 1).

Level 1: A Troop Contributing Country makes a formal pledge for a unit and provides the list of major and self-sustainment equipment and certification of completion of basic training and human rights screening. Member States are encouraged to include the time frame of availability and duration of deployment for each pledged capability.

⁹ DOTMLPFM-I assessment stands for doctrine and policy, organization, training and education, material, leadership, personnel, facilities, maintenance and logistics, and interoperability. The objective of a DOTMLPFM-I assessment is to “identify capability deficits in a military project, providing an estimation of the reliability of its scope and methods, through a functional mission and needs analysis” (Fernandez-Osorio, 2016, p. 57).

Level 2: Based on the UN operational requirements, pledges at Level 1 can be elevated to Level 2 after an assessment and advisory visit has been conducted by a UN Headquarters team.

Level 3: Following a satisfactory assessment, units which have achieved a reasonable degree of preparedness are elevated to Level 3.

Rapid Deployment Level (RDL): Having reached Level 3, the Troop Contributing Country may pledge to deploy within 60 days following a request made by the UN Headquarters.


Such quantity of troops and equipment may be required in-country to improve defense/security levels and to fight against FARC dissidences and other organized armed groups. Likewise, this situation may pose a risk to Colombia as engaging troops and equipment in such long missions may entail a heavy burden to in-country capabilities, especially because UNMDPO increasingly need not only infantry soldiers but also highly specialized troops and expensive equipment (enablers such as engineers, helicopters and crews, transportation, communication experts, and medical personnel) (UN DPKO, 2017g).

Another common perception in Colombia is that countries emerging from armed conflicts by peace agreements no longer require the same military capabilities as they previously did and, hence, military defense expenditure should be decreased and the armed forces should redirect some of their experience to support international missions as a method of raising funds, encouraging self-sufficiency, and even contributing to the national economy (Alarcon, 2015; Ruiz et al., 2016; Acosta, 2016; Herran, 2016). Hence, a regression analysis was undertaken to determine whether the contribution of personnel to UNMDPO is correlated with an increase/decrease in GDP and an increase/decrease in military expenditure. Appendix 9 shows how these two predictors, when taken as a set, account for 0.4% of the variance in the contribution of personnel to UNMDPO ($R^2 = 0.04$). The overall regression model was non-significant, $\alpha = 0.05$, $F(2,28) = 0.54$, $p = 0.591074 > 0.05$, meaning that there is a 59.10% chance that the ANOVA output was obtained by chance. These results imply that, based on international experience, both the variation in the national GDP and the variation in military

expenditure are not correlated with the contribution of personnel to UNMDPO. Hence, stronger reasons should be considered when making a decision on participation in such operations. In fact, as explained by Mora-Tebas (2016, pp. 8-10), although the UN reimburses contributing countries depending on the personnel and material provided to the mission, the values compensated are not significant and take time to be released.

Figure 2 depicts the variations in GDP and military expenditure of 31 countries with peace agreements, from five years prior to the agreement to ten years thereafter. The figure shows how, during the years of conflict, significant proportions of the GDP are usually bound to the defense/security sector. This tendency is relatively maintained during the first three years following the signature of the peace agreement. However, from the fourth year, the GDP starts to increase, presumably due to a renewed stable and peaceful scenario. In turn, military expenditure starts to decrease.

Figure 2. Variations in national GDP in billions of USD and military expenditure as %GDP of 31 countries, from five years prior to a peace agreement until ten years thereafter (1989-2012)



Source: prepared by the author based on information from the Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies (2015b), SIPRI (2016), and International Monetary Fund (2017)

Finally, there is a common impression that UNMDPO are important as an enhancer of foreign policy and legitimacy (Sanahuja & Verdes-Montenegro, 2014; Tickner, 2016);

Although this idea is not exclusive to Colombia (Pohl, 2014; Hirst & Nasser, 2014; Hastedt, 2017), several elements in Colombia should be considered before considering the exportation of defense/security personnel as equivalent to traditional diplomacy. As suggested by Martinez and Duran (2017, p. 17), well-developed international missions may help to modernize the armed forces, change the mentality of the servicemen and women, and improve legitimacy, public opinion, and civil-military relations. However, involvement in an ill-chosen UNMDPO may signify negative results contrary to those sought both by the country and by the UN. The case of Rwanda in which the UN failed to stop the genocide between Tutsis and Hutus (Dallaire & Power, 2004) is a vivid example in which unaware and unprepared troops among a volatile scenario may curtail the scope of UNMDPO.

Several countries have identified participation in UNMDPO as a heavy burden on their economies and the effectiveness of their international affairs, especially when the cooperation with supra-national organisms may signify a paradox between pursuing national interests and creating a regional security dilemma (Mills, 1991; Fetterly, 2006; Serafino, 2007; Hultman, Kathman, & Shannon, 2013, 2014; Marolov & Stojanovski, 2015). On the one hand, countries may benefit from international cooperation and alliances to guarantee their national interests; but on the other hand, such defense/security agreements may endanger local coalitions which could react by maximizing military capabilities and limiting diplomatic mechanisms between nations. For example, the announcement of Colombia's signature of an agreement with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) to share information and to cooperate to tackle common defense/security challenges provoked a military escalation by Venezuela and several criticisms from Ecuador, Nicaragua and Bolivia (Adamczyk, 2016; Long, 2016; TeleSur, 2016). Although, to date, no criticism has been aroused regarding the participation of Colombia in UNMDPO from countries in the Latin-American region. Possible complaints may surface if the actual unstable socio-economic and political circumstances of some countries deteriorate.

Conclusion

Colombia's success in its participation in UNMDPO may determine the future of highly trained and experienced military personnel from countries in which conflicts are being concluded and, hence, an option to export military capabilities to prevent of the relapse of violent conflict and the decline of possible new forms of aggression. However, cautious assessment before accepting such a demanding responsibility should be made to avoid erroneous conceptions which may led to inadequate resolutions and strategies, converting such a decision into a national paradox between pursuing national interests or international recognition.

This article has shown how some of the reasons for participation in UNMDPO widespread in Colombia are inaccurate and disregard other significant elements by considering the international experience of 31 countries with characteristics similar to those of Colombia and which have emerged from violent intrastate conflicts. Firstly, the understanding of participation in UNMDPO as a tendency to follow is inaccurate if it only considers the necessity of gaining international recognition or the improvement of foreign policy. The results of the regression analysis have shown how the level of implementation of the peace agreement with the FARC may be the best indicator for deciding when to start contributing peacekeepers and equipment to UNMDPO. Additionally, the fulfilment of DDR, resolving grievances with social and minority rights, and providing an adequate solution to the criminal groups issue is central to guarantee an exemplar contribution to peacekeeping.

Secondly, conventional wisdom in Colombia usually disregards the scope of UNMDPO and their associated risks. For example, the average duration of such operations and the average fatalities associated therewith are rarely mentioned. Neither is the impact of possible UNMDPO ill-assessed missions on the prestige of the Colombian armed forces. A thoughtful DOTMLPFM-I assessment should be completed considering the possible operations, their environments, and their relevant cultural elements.

Thirdly, the idea of using UNMDPO as a source of funding for both the Colombian armed forces and the government is imprecise and contradictory as international experience has shown that participation in UNMDPO requires an adequate budget to sustain contingents and equipment. UN reimbursement is fair and takes time to be released. Likewise, countries emerging from violent conflicts tend to reduce defense budgets as their GDP increases, showing a tendency to funnel some parts of military expenditure to other areas.

Fourthly, while UNMDPO may improve legitimacy and civil-military relations, it poses a dilemma when alliances with organisms such as the UN signify a choice between pursuing international interests and producing a local security dilemma with countries which do not agree with international coalitions outside of the relevant region.

This article has raised many questions on this under-researched topic. It does not pretend to cover every possible aspect within the discussion. On the contrary, it has aimed to make an initial approach to the theme, highlighting the necessity of further research before making final conclusions. Besides, this article provides the Colombian government and the armed forces with an academic framework to advance in at least three areas: to identify the strategies and interactions between actors in UNMDPO, to analyze the institutional changes required in the defense/security sector needed to participate in UNMDPO, and to improve the decision-making process to assess possible missions in which to participate in light of the capabilities and experience of the armed forces.

Appendix 1. United Nations' peacekeeping missions led by the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (1948-2017)

<i>No.</i>	<i>Acronym</i>	<i>Peacekeeping mission name</i>	<i>Start date</i>	<i>End date</i>	<i>Duration (years)</i>	<i>Accident</i>	<i>Illness</i>	<i>Malicious acts</i>	<i>Other</i>	<i>Total</i>
1	UNTSO	UN Truce Supervision Organization	May-48	Aug-17	69.3	14	8	26	3	51
2	UNMOGIP	UN Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan	Jan-49	Aug-17	68.6	9	2	0	0	11
3	UNEF I	First UN Emergency Force	Nov-56	Jun-67	10.6	0	0	0	0	0
4	UNOGIL	UN Observation Group in Lebanon	Jun-58	Dec-58	0.5	0	0	0	0	0
5	ONUC	UN Operation in the Congo	Jul-60	Jun-64	3.9	70	40	135	4	249
6	UNSF	UN Security Force in West New Guinea	Oct-62	Apr-63	0.5	0	0	0	0	0
7	UNYOM	UN Yemen Observation Mission	Jul-63	Sep-64	1.2	0	0	0	0	0
8	UNFICYP	UN Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus	Mar-64	Aug-17	53.5	99	45	15	24	183
9	DOMREP	Mission of the Representative of the Secretary-General in the Dominican Republic	May-65	Oct-66	1.4	0	0	0	0	0
10	UNIPOM	UN India-Pakistan Observation Mission	Sep-65	Mar-66	0.5	0	0	0	0	0
11	UNEF II	Second UN Emergency Force	Oct-73	Jul-79	5.8	86	28	35	11	160
12	UNDOF	UN Disengagement Observer Force	Jun-74	Aug-17	43.2	20	7	8	12	47
13	UNIFIL	UN Interim Force in Lebanon	Mar-78	Aug-17	39.4	131	68	93	20	312
14	UNGOMAP	UN Good Offices Mission in Afghanistan and Pakistan	May-88	Mar-90	1.8	0	0	0	0	0
15	UNIIMOG	UN Iran-Iraq Military Observer Group	Aug-88	Feb-91	2.5	1	0	0	0	1
16	UNAVEM I	UN Angola Verification Mission I	Jan-89	Jun-91	2.4	0	0	0	0	0
17	UNTAG	UN Transition Assistance Group	Apr-89	Mar-90	0.9	16	2	1	0	19
18	ONUCA	UN Observer Group in Central America	Nov-89	Jan-92	2.2	0	0	0	0	0
19	UNIKOM	UN Iraq-Kuwait Observation Mission	Apr-91	Oct-03	12.5	13	4	1	0	18
20	MINURSO	UN Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara	Apr-91	Aug-17	26.4	10	5	0	1	16
21	UNAVEM II	UN Angola Verification Mission II	Jun-91	Feb-95	3.7	14	19	7	1	41
22	ONUSAL	UN Observer Mission in El Salvador	Jul-91	Apr-95	3.8	1	3	0	1	5
23	UNAMIC	UN Advance Mission in Cambodia	Oct-91	Mar-92	0.4	0	0	0	0	0
24	UNPROFOR	UN Protection Force	Feb-92	Mar-95	3.1	100	27	74	12	213
25	UNTAC	UN Transitional Authority in Cambodia	Mar-92	Sep-93	1.5	32	20	25	5	82
26	UNOSOM I	UN Operation in Somalia I	Apr-92	Mar-93	0.9	0	0	0	0	0
27	ONUMOZ	UN Operation in Mozambique	Dec-91	Dec-94	3.0	15	9	1	1	26

<i>No.</i>	<i>Acronym</i>	<i>Peacekeeping mission name</i>	<i>Start date</i>	<i>End date</i>	<i>Duration (years)</i>	<i>Accident</i>	<i>Illness</i>	<i>Malicious acts</i>	<i>Other</i>	<i>Total</i>
28	UNOSOM II	UN Operation in Somalia II	Mar-93	Mar-95	2.0	36	9	114	2	161
29	UNOMUR	UN Observer Mission Uganda-Rwanda	Jun-93	Sep-94	1.3	0	0	0	0	0
30	UNOMIG	UN Observer Mission in Georgia	Aug-93	Jun-09	15.8	2	2	8	0	12
31	UNOMIL	UN Observer Mission in Liberia	Sep-93	Sep-97	4.0	0	0	0	0	0
32	UNMIH	UN Mission in Haiti	Sep-93	Jun-96	2.8	4	2	1	2	9
33	UNAMIR	UN Assistance Mission for Rwanda	Oct-93	Mar-96	2.4	7	4	14	2	27
34	UNASOG	UN Aouzou Strip Observer Group	May-94	Jun-94	0.1	0	0	0	0	0
35	UNMOT	UN Mission of Observers in Tajikistan	Dec-94	May-00	5.4	1	0	6	0	7
36	UNAVEM III	UN Angola Verification Mission III	Feb-95	Jun-97	2.3	0	0	0	0	0
37	UNPREDEP	UN Preventive Deployment Force	Mar-95	Feb-99	3.9	4	0	0	0	4
38	UNPF	UN Peace Force in Croatia	Mar-95	Jan-96	0.8	7	1	3	2	13
39	UNCRO	UN Confidence Restoration Operation in Croatia	May-95	Jan-96	0.7	8	0	8	0	16
40	UNMIBH	UN Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina	Dec-95	Dec-02	7.0	6	5	0	1	12
41	UNTAES	UN Transitional Administration for Eastern Slavonia, Baranja and Western Sirmium	Jan-96	Jan-98	2.0	6	3	2	0	11
42	UNMOP	UN Mission of Observers in Prevlaka	Jan-96	Dec-02	6.9	0	0	0	0	0
43	UNSMIH	UN Support Mission in Haiti	Jul-96	Jul-97	1.0	0	1	0	0	1
44	MINUGUA	UN Verification Mission in Guatemala	Jan-97	May-97	0.3	4	0	0	0	4
45	MONUA	UN Observer Mission in Angola	Jun-97	Feb-99	1.7	9	4	5	4	22
46	UNTMIH	UN Transition Mission in Haiti	Aug-97	Dec-97	0.3	0	0	0	0	0
47	MIPONUH	UN Civilian Police Mission in Haiti	Dec-97	Mar-00	2.2	6	0	1	0	7
48	UNPSG	UN Civilian Police Support Group	Jan-98	Oct-98	0.7	1	0	0	0	1
49	MINURCA	UN Mission in the Central African Republic	Apr-98	Feb-00	1.8	2	0	0	0	2
50	UNOMSIL	UN Observer Mission in Sierra Leone	Jul-98	Oct-99	1.3	0	0	0	0	0
51	UNMIK	UN Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo	Jun-99	Aug-17	18.2	12	23	12	8	55
52	UNAMSIL	UN Mission in Sierra Leone	Oct-99	Dec-05	6.2	79	87	17	9	192
53	UNTAET	UN Transitional Administration in East Timor	Oct-99	May-02	2.6	14	10	2	0	26
54	MONUC	UN Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo	Nov-99	Jun-10	10.6	32	88	34	7	161
55	UNMEE	UN Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea	Jul-00	Jul-08	8.0	4	15	0	1	20

<i>No.</i>	<i>Acronym</i>	<i>Peacekeeping mission name</i>	<i>Start date</i>	<i>End date</i>	<i>Duration (years)</i>	<i>Accident</i>	<i>Illness</i>	<i>Malicious acts</i>	<i>Other</i>	<i>Total</i>
56	UNAMA	UN Mission in Afghanistan	Mar-02	Aug-17	15.4	6	9	10	4	29
57	UNMISET	UN Mission of Support in East Timor	May-02	May-05	3.0	7	11	2	1	21
58	UNMIL	UN Mission in Liberia	Sep-03	Aug-17	13.9	43	144	3	10	200
59	UNOCI	UN Operation in Côte d'Ivoire	Apr-04	Aug-17	13.3	56	74	10	10	150
60	MINUSTAH	UN Stabilization Mission in Haiti	Jun-04	Aug-17	13.2	128	32	15	11	186
61	ONUB	UN Operation in Burundi	Jun-04	Dec-06	2.5	11	9	3	1	24
62	UNMIS	UN Mission in the Sudan	Mar-05	Jul-11	6.3	11	41	4	4	60
63	UNMIT	UN Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste	Aug-05	Dec-12	7.3	4	9	1	3	17
64	UNAMID	African Union-UN Hybrid Operation in Darfur	Jul-07	Aug-17	10.1	40	111	73	26	250
65	MINURCAT	UN Mission in the Central African Republic and Chad	Sep-07	Dec-10	3.3	4	4	1	0	9
66	MONUSCO	UN Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Rep. of the Congo	Jul-10	Aug-17	7.1	32	56	12	12	112
67	UNISFA	UN Organization Interim Security Force for Abyei	Jun-11	Aug-17	6.2	9	4	7	2	22
68	UNMISS	UN Mission in the Republic of South Sudan	Jul-11	Aug-17	6.1	12	20	13	5	50
69	UNSMIS	UN Supervision Mission in Syria	Apr-12	Aug-12	0.3	0	0	1	0	1
70	MINUSMA	UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali	Apr-13	Aug-17	4.3	17	26	79	6	128
71	MINUSCA	UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic	Apr-14	Aug-17	3.3	4	11	23	6	44

Source: prepared by the author based on data from the UN DPKO (2017d, 2017f).

Appendix 2. United Nations' peacekeeping missions NON-LED by the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (1948-2017)

<i>No.</i>	<i>Acronym</i>	<i>Peacekeeping mission name</i>	<i>Start date</i>	<i>End date</i>	<i>Duration (years)</i>	<i>Accident</i>	<i>Illness</i>	<i>Malicious acts</i>	<i>Other</i>	<i>Total</i>
1	UNGCI	UN Guards Contingent in Iraq	May-91	Nov-03	12.5	5	2	1	0	8
2	UN SMA	UN Special Mission to Afghanistan	Dec-93	May-01	7.4	1	0	1	0	2
3	UN POS	UN Political Office for Somalia	Apr-95	Jun-13	18.2	1	1	0	0	2
4	IPTF	UN International Police Task Force	Dec-95	Dec-02	7.0	6	0	0	0	6
5	UNIOSIL	UN Integrated Office in Sierra Leone	Jan-06	Sep-08	2.7	1	3	0	0	4
6	UNAMET	UN Mission in East Timor	Jun-99	Sep-99	0.3	0	1	7	0	8
7	BONUCA	UN Peacebuilding Support Office in the Central African Rep.	Feb-00	Dec-09	9.8	0	1	0	0	1
8	MICAH	International Civilian Support Mission in Haiti	Mar-00	Feb-01	0.9	0	0	1	0	1
9	BINUCA	UN Integrated Peacebuilding Office in the Central African Rep	Jan-00	Mar-14	14.2	0	0	0	0	0
10	UNMA	UN Mission in Angola	Aug-02	Feb-03	0.5	1	0	0	0	1
11	UNOWA	UN Office for West Africa	Oct-02	Jan-16	13.3	1	1	0	0	2
12	UNOHCI	Office of the Humanitarian Coordinator in Iraq	Jun-03	Aug-17	14.2	1	1	25	0	27
13	UNAMI	UN Assistance Mission for Iraq	Aug-03	Aug-17	14.0	3	11	1	3	18
14	UNMAO	UN Mine Action Office in the Sudan	Mar-05	Jul-11	6.3	0	1	0	0	1
15	UNMIN	UN Mission in Nepal	Jan-07	Jan-11	4.0	6	0	0	0	6
16	UNIPSIL	UN Integrated Peacebuilding Office in Sierra Leone	Sep-08	Mar-14	5.5	0	1	0	0	1
17	UNOAU	UN Office to the African Union	Jul-10	Aug-17	7.1	0	1	0	0	1
18	UNSOM	The UN Assistance Mission in Somalia	Jun-13	Aug-17	4.2	1	0	0	0	1
19	UNSCOB	UN Special Commission for the Balkans	Oct-47	Feb-52	4.3	2	0	0	0	2
20	UN Secretariat	UN Secretariat	Oct-47	Aug-17	4.3	4	0	1	2	7

Source: prepared by the author based on data from the UN DPKO (2017d, 2017f).

Appendix 3. Summary output – first group of predictors on the variance of contribution of personnel to UNMDPO

<i>Regression Statistics</i>					
Multiple R		0.84			
R Square		0.70			
Adjusted R Square		0.47			
Standard Error		1610.06			
Observations		31			
<i>ANOVA</i>					
	<i>df</i>	<i>SS</i>	<i>MS</i>	<i>F</i>	<i>Significance F</i>
Regression	13	103038674.78	7926051.91	3.06	0.016522
Residual	17	44069029.99	2592295.88		
Total	30	147107704.77			
	<i>Coefficients</i>	<i>Standard Error</i>	<i>t Stat</i>	<i>P-value</i>	<i>Lower 95%</i>
Intercept	5829.49	1965.51	2.97	0.008662	1682.63
Implementation (0-100%)	-70.49	26.62	-2.65	0.016915	-126.65
Amnesty (Y-N)	-667.63	686.31	-0.97	0.344300	-2115.61
Arms embargo (Y-N)	-2061.30	1187.04	-1.74	0.100559	-4565.73
Boundary demarcation (Y-N)	1928.31	1331.50	1.45	0.165749	-880.92
Cease fire (Y-N)	-743.85	1097.68	-0.68	0.507110	-3059.76
Children's rights (Y-N)	662.68	948.30	0.70	0.494117	-1338.04
Citizenship reform (Y-N)	1675.95	771.10	2.17	0.044167	49.08
Civil administration reform (Y-N)	-619.40	682.81	-0.91	0.377018	-2060.01
Commission to address damage/loss (Y-N)	-380.97	2405.97	-0.16	0.876052	-5457.11
Constitutional reform (Y-N)	-92.01	904.43	-0.10	0.920159	-2000.18
Cultural protections (Y-N)	-1378.54	961.46	-1.43	0.169765	-3407.04
Decentralization/federalism (Y-N)	230.12	826.98	0.28	0.784163	-1514.65
Demobilization (Y-N)	2354.34	1086.70	2.17	0.044772	61.61

Source: prepared by the author using the STATA 13 software. Values with *P*-value < 0.05 are highlighted.

Appendix 4. Summary output – second group of predictors on the variance of contribution of personnel to UNMDPO

<i>Regression Statistics</i>					
Multiple R		0.80			
R Square		0.64			
Adjusted R Square		0.36			
Standard Error		1772.37			
Observations		31			
<i>ANOVA</i>					
	<i>df</i>	<i>SS</i>	<i>MS</i>	<i>F</i>	<i>Significance F</i>
Regression	13	93705615.92	7208124.30	2.29	0.055057
Residual	17	53402088.86	3141299.34		
Total	30	147107704.77			
	<i>Coefficients</i>	<i>Standard Error</i>	<i>t Stat</i>	<i>P-value</i>	<i>Lower 95%</i>
Intercept	-143.22	1389.93	-0.10	0.919137	-3075.71
Detailed implementation timeline (Y-N)	-122.11	916.60	-0.13	0.895583	-2055.96
Disarmament (Y-N)	2835.09	1292.24	2.19	0.042427	108.71
Dispute resolution committee (Y-N)	-943.52	1002.92	-0.94	0.359999	-3059.51
Donor support (Y-N)	-1792.18	884.08	-2.03	0.058622	-3657.42
Economic and social development (Y-N)	1780.14	857.94	2.07	0.053490	-29.95
Education reform (Y-N)	-539.60	804.02	-0.67	0.511157	-2235.93
Electoral/political party reform (Y-N)	-109.66	1062.76	-0.10	0.919026	-2351.89
Executive branch reform (Y-N)	1374.27	1006.54	1.37	0.189941	-749.34
Human rights (Y-N)	-451.31	923.83	-0.49	0.631425	-2400.43
Independence referendum (Y-N)	-1545.20	1246.45	-1.24	0.231933	-4174.98
Indigenous minority rights (Y-N)	2001.01	1257.32	1.59	0.129921	-651.69
Inter-ethnic/state relations (Y-N)	168.42	1129.68	0.15	0.883243	-2215.01
Internally displaced persons (Y-N)	-849.84	1034.00	-0.82	0.422516	-3031.38

Source: prepared by the author using the STATA 13 software. Values with *P*-value < 0.05 are highlighted.

Appendix 5. Summary output – third group of predictors on the variance of contribution of personnel to UNMDPO

Regression Statistics

Multiple R	0.79
R Square	0.62
Adjusted R Square	0.33
Standard Error	1806.35
Observations	31

ANOVA

	<i>df</i>	<i>SS</i>	<i>MS</i>	<i>F</i>	<i>Significance F</i>
Regression	13	91638629.80	7049125.37	2.16	0.068861
Residual	17	55469074.97	3262886.76		
Total	30	147107704.77			

	<i>Coefficients</i>	<i>Standard Error</i>	<i>t Stat</i>	<i>P-value</i>	<i>Lower 95%</i>
Intercept	1437.52	928.36	1.55	0.139928	-521.15
International arbitration (Y-N)	-1103.65	2547.74	-0.43	0.670325	-6478.91
Judiciary reform (Y-N)	1267.82	750.92	1.69	0.109599	-316.47
Legislative branch reform (Y-N)	1124.59	945.00	1.19	0.250384	-869.19
Media reform (Y-N)	-288.88	965.14	-0.30	0.768330	-2325.14
Military reform (Y-N)	6.18	1050.41	0.01	0.995372	-2210.00
Minority rights (Y-N)	2751.95	1040.35	2.65	0.017009	557.01
Natural resource management (Y-N)	-902.26	798.90	-1.13	0.274427	-2587.80
Official Language and Symbol (Y-N)	-421.09	916.70	-0.46	0.651803	-2355.16
Paramilitary groups (Y-N)	-2127.91	931.03	-2.29	0.035393	-4092.21
Police reform (Y-N)	121.20	804.28	0.15	0.881987	-1575.68
Power sharing transitional government (Y-N)	-805.78	823.82	-0.98	0.341738	-2543.90
Prisoner release (Y-N)	1519.23	773.12	1.97	0.065963	-111.90
Ratification mechanism (Y-N)	-1687.94	943.72	-1.79	0.091512	-3679.01

Source: prepared by the author using the STATA 13 software. Values with *P*-value < 0.05 are highlighted.

Appendix 6. Summary output – fourth group of predictors on the variance of contribution of personnel to UNMDPO

<i>Regression Statistics</i>					
Multiple R		0.65			
R Square		0.42			
Adjusted R Square		-0.02			
Standard Error		2231.41			
Observations		31			
<i>ANOVA</i>					
	<i>df</i>	<i>SS</i>	<i>MS</i>	<i>F</i>	<i>Significance F</i>
Regression	13	62461588.50	4804737.58	0.96	0.517500
Residual	17	84646116.28	4979183.31		
Total	30	147107704.77			
	<i>Coefficients</i>	<i>Standard Error</i>	<i>t Stat</i>	<i>P-value</i>	<i>Lower 95%</i>
Intercept	-14.30	1817.10	-0.01	0.993814	-3848.05
Refugees (Y-N)	-372.01	1201.84	-0.31	0.760678	-2907.67
Regional peacekeeping force (Y-N)	-2260.94	1383.48	-1.63	0.120588	-5179.82
Reintegration (Y-N)	1882.41	1180.91	1.59	0.129349	-609.09
Reparations (Y-N)	1864.56	1433.12	1.30	0.210602	-1159.07
Review of agreement (Y-N)	-708.42	1253.33	-0.57	0.579301	-3352.71
Right of self-determination (Y-N)	-511.08	1759.48	-0.29	0.774967	-4223.26
Territorial power sharing (Y-N)	-3479.51	2404.28	-1.45	0.166025	-8552.09
Truth or reconciliation mechanism (Y-N)	-597.73	1230.93	-0.49	0.633455	-3194.76
Un peacekeeping force (Y-N)	2022.57	1758.89	1.15	0.266100	-1688.37
UN transitional authority (Y-N)	-3011.43	2679.38	-1.12	0.276664	-8664.42
Verification/monitoring mechanism (Y-N)	271.57	1176.40	0.23	0.820191	-2210.42
Withdrawal of troops (Y-N)	1204.23	1035.77	1.16	0.261034	-981.04
Women's rights (Y-N)	-801.25	1737.55	-0.46	0.650545	-4467.16

Source: prepared by the author using the STATA 13 software. Values with *P*-value < 0.05 are highlighted.

Appendix 7. Variations in military expenditure as % of GDP from five years prior to a peace agreement until 10 years thereafter (1989-2012)

Country	-5 y	-4 y	-3 y	-2 y	-1 y	P. accord	+1 y	+2 y	+3 y	+4 y	+5 y	+6 y	+7 y	+8 y	+9 y	+10 y	Trend
Angola	5.972	2.642	17.335	6.393	4.524	3.510	4.722	4.162	4.835	4.715	3.362	3.758	4.386	4.245	3.496	3.593	
Bangladesh	0.001	0.001	0.002	0.002	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.001	
Bosnia and Herzegov.	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	3.624	2.417	1.997	1.544	
Burundi	4.209	5.856	6.359	6.572	6.258	4.862	6.071	5.441	5.533	4.903	4.436	3.512	3.415	2.721	-	-	
Cambodia	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1.761	3.842	3.577	3.238	3.003	2.662	2.510	2.210	1.777	
Congo	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1.948	2.341	2.682	2.674	1.658	1.637	2.002	1.752	-	
Croatia	-	-	-	-	-	9.203	8.188	7.544	5.612	4.430	3.030	2.703	2.730	2.047	1.758	1.760	
Djibouti	7.597	6.879	6.871	7.034	6.666	6.246	5.949	4.965	5.282	5.193	4.995	4.721	4.551	5.625	6.714	5.608	
East Timor	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1.676	3.694	4.246	3.408	4.411	
El Salvador	-	-	4.271	4.872	3.414	2.733	2.254	1.679	1.352	1.175	1.074	1.008	0.923	0.921	0.840	1.091	
Guatemala	1.080	1.254	1.079	1.080	0.990	0.821	0.743	0.721	0.676	0.818	1.052	0.762	0.816	0.479	0.384	0.432	
Guinea-Bissau	-	0.856	0.871	0.702	0.677	1.405	-	2.575	1.576	1.530	1.575	-	2.065	-	-	-	
India	3.614	3.423	3.146	2.910	2.705	2.824	2.665	2.578	2.473	2.648	2.727	2.957	2.949	2.924	2.827	2.678	
Indonesia	0.684	0.573	0.700	0.909	0.946	0.751	0.716	0.775	0.633	0.612	0.618	0.654	0.712	0.919	0.778	0.886	
Ivory Coast	-	1.392	1.515	1.463	1.502	1.591	1.523	1.730	1.558	1.408	1.507	1.375	1.526	1.465	-	-	
Lebanon	-	-	-	-	1.187	-	7.552	5.155	7.984	6.011	6.641	6.368	5.374	4.305	4.023	4.771	
Liberia	-	-	-	-	-	-	0.670	1.459	0.650	0.472	0.460	0.623	0.654	0.859	0.875	0.776	
Macedonia	2.960	2.238	2.206	1.803	1.851	6.100	2.646	2.342	2.380	2.029	1.837	1.950	1.742	1.688	1.382	1.262	
Mali	-	2.213	2.112	1.945	-	-	1.579	1.436	1.495	1.427	1.493	1.405	1.275	1.479	1.295	1.269	
Mozambique	-	3.050	3.417	3.368	2.200	2.551	2.431	2.904	1.301	1.023	0.994	1.011	1.066	1.104	1.062	1.063	
Nepal	1.098	1.448	1.592	1.793	1.929	1.749	1.547	1.600	1.645	1.564	1.541	1.432	1.542	1.588	1.509	-	
Niger	-	-	-	-	1.118	0.980	0.875	0.938	1.061	1.167	1.117	1.276	0.952	0.901	1.035	0.963	
Northern Ireland (UK)	3.211	3.025	2.594	2.476	2.321	2.271	2.206	2.156	2.190	2.257	2.314	2.259	2.199	2.146	2.154	2.282	
Papua New Guinea	1.529	1.616	1.321	1.039	0.960	0.822	0.569	0.547	0.622	0.626	0.566	0.620	0.492	0.642	0.477	0.499	
Philippines	2.011	2.036	2.158	2.172	2.294	2.268	1.914	1.697	1.616	1.608	1.471	1.474	1.551	1.361	1.332	1.315	
Rwanda	1.529	1.731	3.730	5.510	4.365	4.536	3.438	4.364	5.329	4.173	4.378	4.448	3.535	3.397	3.047	2.448	
Senegal	1.522	1.333	1.412	1.394	1.412	1.339	1.429	1.587	1.709	1.621	1.682	1.516	1.604	1.386	1.599	1.570	
Sierra Leone	2.906	2.874	1.974	1.116	-	-	3.666	2.771	2.190	2.076	1.604	1.447	1.487	1.347	0.944	1.060	
South Africa	4.624	4.358	3.896	3.223	2.818	2.423	2.489	2.118	1.756	1.582	1.383	1.272	1.387	1.483	1.529	1.469	
Sudan	4.791	2.944	3.274	2.256	5.782	4.392	4.291	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
Tajikistan	0.396	3.442	1.945	1.022	1.289	2.067	1.713	1.392	1.203	1.154	2.095	2.238	2.173	-	-	-	

Source: prepared by the author, based on data from the Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies (2015b) and SIPRI (2016)

Appendix 8. Variations in national GDP in billions of USD from five years prior to a peace agreement until ten years thereafter (1989-2012)

Country	-5 y	-4 y	-3 y	-2 y	-1 y	P. accord	+1 y	+2 y	+3 y	+4 y	+5 y	+6 y	+7 y	+8 y	+9 y	+10 y	Trend
Angola	7,675	6,506	6,153	9,130	8,936	12,497	14,189	19,641	28,234	41,789	60,449	84,178	75,492	82,471	104,116	115,342	
Bangladesh	36,476	38,234	41,538	45,921	48,168	50,340	51,928	53,984	54,586	54,755	57,500	63,204	68,593	70,921	75,770	85,604	
Bosnia and Herzegov.	-	-	-	-	-	-	3,584	4,578	5,281	5,766	5,554	5,784	6,711	8,477	10,157	10,935	
Burundi	1,000	0,868	0,972	0,893	0,866	0,870	0,877	0,825	0,785	0,915	1,117	1,273	1,356	1,612	1,775	2,032	
Cambodia	0,205	0,141	0,276	0,346	0,899	2,011	2,439	2,427	2,765	3,441	3,507	3,443	3,130	3,513	3,667	3,992	
Congo	1,769	2,116	2,540	2,323	1,949	2,357	3,220	2,794	3,020	3,503	4,655	6,098	7,738	7,446	10,224	9,363	
Croatia	-	-	12,247	12,968	17,349	22,388	23,601	23,974	25,346	23,374	21,774	23,289	26,878	34,659	41,574	45,416	
Djibouti	-	-	0,462	0,478	0,466	0,492	0,498	0,494	0,503	0,514	0,541	0,556	0,577	0,596	0,628	0,666	
East Timor	-	-	-	-	-	-	0,444	0,494	0,483	0,503	1,102	1,846	2,819	2,903	4,487	3,391	
El Salvador	2,366	2,762	3,157	4,801	5,311	5,955	6,938	8,086	9,501	10,316	11,135	12,008	12,465	13,134	13,813	14,307	
Guatemala	8,687	9,625	10,462	11,855	13,314	14,218	16,103	17,488	16,492	17,187	18,703	20,777	21,918	23,965	27,211	30,231	
Guinea-Bissau	3,279	3,383	3,693	3,868	3,783	3,588	3,461	2,995	2,829	2,950	3,446	3,666	2,937	2,903	4,157	4,517	
India	299,645	300,187	326,608	274,842	293,262	284,194	333,014	366,600	399,791	423,189	428,767	466,841	476,636	493,934	523,768	618,369	
Indonesia	179,482	174,507	212,807	255,428	279,556	310,815	396,293	470,144	558,582	577,539	755,256	892,590	919,002	916,646	891,051	861,143	
Ivory Coast	12,390	15,336	16,576	17,115	17,817	20,373	24,339	24,341	24,931	25,693	26,797	31,281	35,373	32,764	35,489	36,873	
Lebanon	4,327	3,614	2,817	3,298	3,314	2,718	2,838	4,452	5,546	7,535	9,110	11,119	12,997	15,745	17,289	17,405	
Liberia	-	-	0,588	0,614	0,639	0,511	0,585	0,675	0,757	0,942	1,084	1,142	1,292	1,540	1,746	1,962	
Macedonia	4,642	3,928	3,764	3,867	3,774	3,709	3,991	4,946	5,684	6,257	6,860	8,337	9,912	9,400	9,415	10,659	
Mali	2,308	2,316	2,827	3,223	3,285	3,373	3,362	2,575	3,337	3,416	3,208	3,328	3,444	2,963	3,468	3,903	
Mozambique	2,803	2,463	2,574	4,130	3,217	2,177	2,265	2,458	2,524	3,468	4,110	4,718	5,167	4,667	4,567	4,977	
Nepal	5,891	5,976	6,328	7,274	8,180	9,044	10,325	12,545	12,855	16,002	19,011	18,852	19,270	19,995	21,314	21,154	
Niger	2,480	2,328	2,345	2,221	1,563	1,756	1,880	1,733	1,981	1,916	1,671	1,815	2,073	2,645	2,901	3,375	
Northern Ireland (UK)	1,139,199	1,220,824	1,320,618	1,394,478	1,537,558	1,623,794	1,652,539	1,638,702	1,613,588	1,760,454	2,030,626	2,390,268	2,511,165	2,682,213	3,064,351	2,898,941	
Papua New Guinea	7,740	7,398	5,655	5,160	5,258	4,610	4,580	5,584	6,276	7,312	8,306	9,439	11,549	11,550	14,205	17,953	
Philippines	50,320	58,695	60,237	71,003	82,121	91,792	91,234	72,207	82,995	81,023	76,262	81,358	83,908	91,371	103,074	122,211	
Rwanda	2,495	2,605	2,491	1,837	1,950	1,881	1,195	1,239	1,343	1,808	1,931	1,797	1,718	1,676	1,668	1,835	
Senegal	5,151	4,693	4,882	5,352	6,872	8,042	8,722	9,367	11,301	13,439	12,805	12,948	14,388	14,235	14,858	15,362	
Sierra Leone	1,331	1,273	1,374	1,240	0,981	0,977	0,941	1,084	1,250	1,380	1,439	1,649	1,884	2,159	2,511	2,454	
South Africa	95,207	99,044	115,533	123,964	134,557	134,345	139,804	155,461	147,701	152,611	137,686	136,550	136,453	121,602	115,748	175,254	
Sudan	12,257	13,182	14,803	17,645	21,457	26,524	35,820	45,897	54,526	53,145	65,318	66,865	62,647	65,507	71,081	81,444	
Tajikistan	0,291	0,678	0,829	0,569	1,052	1,121	1,320	1,087	0,991	1,057	1,212	1,555	2,073	2,311	2,811	3,712	

Source: prepared by the author, based on data from the Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies (2015b) and the International Monetary Fund (2017)

Appendix 9. Summary output – influence of GDP and Mil. Exp. on the variance of contribution of personnel to UNMDPO

<i>Regression Statistics</i>					
Multiple R		0.19			
R Square		0.04			
Adjusted R Square		-0.03			
Standard Error		2249.48			
Observations		31			
<i>ANOVA</i>					
	<i>df</i>	<i>SS</i>	<i>MS</i>	<i>F</i>	<i>Significance F</i>
Regression	2	5422615.03	2711307.52	0.54	0.591074
Residual	28	141685089.74	5060181.78		
Total	30	147107704.77			
	<i>Coefficients</i>	<i>Standard Error</i>	<i>t Stat</i>	<i>P-value</i>	<i>Lower 95%</i>
Intercept	1755.01	786.72	2.23	0.033885	143.48
GDP	0.00	0.00	0.50	0.620513	0.00
Milex %GDP	-237.60	270.62	-0.88	0.387413	-791.94

Source: prepared by the author using the STATA 13 software. Values with *P*-value < 0.05 are highlighted.

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